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return of the human order to its ground and first principle, Thomas intro-
duces the theology of the Incarnation, of the ecclesial community, and of 
grace and the sacramental system. 
Hibbs puts together a compelling argument to show that Thomas com-
posed the SCC for fellow Christian irlquirers to show how them how they 
can and should situate their philosophical inquiries within the broader and 
more ample horizons of revealed theology and speculative theological 
inquiry. Christian life itself can be viewed as the pursuit of the same com-
prehensive knowledge or wisdom sought by the pagan thinkers of old, but 
now a pursuit wi th enhanced chances of success. The Christian inquirer 
knows by gift both aspects of the inner life of that subject she or he most 
desires to know and the sure path to contemplative communion with the 
same. The SCC is then an important protest against both separatist views 
of the life of philosophical and theological learning and especially against 
those views, such as the movement of Latin Averroism, in which philo-
sophicallearning is accorded a practical if not overtly theoretical superiori-
ty to its theological counterpart. 
Not so for Aquinas for whom faith is a higher mode of cognition than 
philosophical reason since faith in his view is nothing but a share in the cog-
nition of a higher reason-divine uncreated reason. As Hibbs shows in 
detail, far from isolating the philosophical from the theological perspective 
on what is, the SCC continually interweaves philosophical and theological 
themes, and Thomas frequently takes his reader from the intelligibility of 
philosophical theses to the intelligibility of scriptural texts. Philosophical 
dialectic is inserted by Aquinas into the narrative of revelation and instru-
mentalized by that knowledge-by-divine-testimony which is faith. The great 
accomplishment of the SCC is the bringing into direct interrelation the theo-
logical and philosophical viewpoints and their respective methods of exposi-
tion and inquiry. 
To summarize the book's content, Chapter 1 of Dialectic and Narrative 
treats Aquinas's understanding of the relation between pedagogy and 
philosophical-cum-theological writing; Chapters 2 through 5 canvass the 
central themes of the SCC's extraordinary attempt at a systematic and 
general explanation of the coming forth and return of all things to Cod. 
Hibbs then restates and amplifies his case against the SCC as a mission-
ary manual or work of apologetics in a handy appendix at the book's 
end. All in all this is a very perceptive and valuable study of its kind, 
one well worth careful reading and re-reading. 
Fact, Value, and God by Arthur F. Holmes. William B. Eerdmans Pub-
lishing Company, 1997. Pp. viii and 183. $18.00 
PATRICIA SAYRE, Saint Mary's College 
We live in confusing times. Eternal verities have come to look suspi-
ciously like fictions masquerading as facts; rational justifications threat-
en to devolve into mere rationalizations; value claims appear all too 
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often to function as tools of oppression. We share no common ontology, 
no common philosophical psychology, no common religious commit-
ment; hence it is becoming increasingly difficult to discover common 
courts of appeal for settling our moral disagreements. Small wonder 
that we more readily define our current situation in terms of old mean-
ings lost than new meanings gained. Such is life in a post-modern, post-
Enlightenment, post-Christian world. 
Bringing conceptual order out of chaos has been one of the traditional 
prerogatives of the philosopher. In even the best of times this is no easy 
task, but when the chaos extends even to the standard tools of the 
philosopher's trade, the complications increase exponentially. When 
our disorientation is such that we no longer know which, if any, meth-
ods of reasoning we can trust, offering arguments and theories is of little 
use. Before we can begin to sort out our confusions, we need orientation 
of a more basic sort. We need a story about how we got into our current 
fix. In Fact, Value and God, Arthur Holmes gives us such a story, 
recounting in broad overview the history of a project central to the 
development of western thought: the project of grounding ethics in an 
ontology that transcends both historical change and human choice. 
The first half of Holmes' tale traces the evolution of the Pre-Socratic 
notion of cosmic justice into the elaborated teleology of high medieval 
Christendom. As the story unfolds, we see how various conceptions of 
divinity-Plato's World Soul, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, the Divine 
Logos of Middle Platonism, and the Triune God of Christian theists-
each contributed to an articulation of the ethical conviction that values 
are rooted in reality. There were, of course, dissenting voices along the 
way, and some of the more interesting episodes in this first portion of 
Holmes' saga deal with the struggles of the early church to resist render-
ings of the faith that undermined the notion that goodness is intrinsic a 1-
ly present in all of creation. Eventually emerging from the various 
Christo logical controversies was a commitment to the convertibility of 
being and goodness that became central to the outlooks of the two most 
powerful Christian thinkers of the medieval period. For both Augustine 
and Aquinas, it is the thread that ties the whole of their thought togeth-
er, guaranteeing a place for God as the ultimate ground for all that we 
are and should be. 
Halfway through Fact, Value, and God, Holmes' tale of the pre-modern 
evolution of an all-encompassing teleology suddenly becomes the tale of 
its modern devolution. Ockham is assigned prime responsibility for this 
altered course; the enthusiastic reception of his nominalism went hand 
in hand with the emergence of a mechanistic conception of nature that 
drove a major wedge between fact and value. At first, this new non-tele-
ological vision of the natural world was felt as a shifting rather than a 
loss of ontological ground. The Protestant thinkers who adopted the 
Ockhamist notion that morality is to be grounded in the will of God 
rather than metaphysical necessity of an immutable natural law did not 
conceive of themselves as abandoning metaphysics, but as offering a 
rendition of the moral ontology implicit in Scripture that had been puri-
fied of illegitimate Greek importations into Christian theology. 
582 Faith and Philosophy 
In a universe that is no longer intrinsically but only contingently 
moral, our sources of moral knowledge shift from the world without to 
the world within. Right reason and the capacity to respond to revela-
tion, not the natural order of things, become our guides. These in turn 
are grounded in human nature, either, as the moral sense theorists 
thought, in an inborn moral faculty, or, as the empiricists thought, in 
other sensory or affective faculties which shape our moral responses. 
This already attenuated teleology is stretched even thinner by nine-
teenth century attempts to transform the study of human nature into an 
empirical science. Explanations linking human character to a divine 
source are in this fashion simply ruled out of court, and the very notion 
of a universally shared human nature becomes questionable. It thus is 
no great surprise when Holmes' story culminates with the complete loss 
objective moral reference that we find in Nietzsche's thought. 
Out of this complex tale four basic positions emerge. The first, which 
Holmes calls the 'maximalist position,' is the dominant perspective in 
pre-modern philosophy. Although it is gradually eroded by develop-
ments in modern thought, maximalism does have substantial moments 
of resurgence; both Kant and Hegel, on Holmes' reading, remain com-
mitted to the project of grounding morality in an intrinsically teleologi-
cal order. Kant situates the natural, or phenomenal, order in the larger 
context of a moral teleology in which "nature's overall purpose is 
human moral development." (p. 126) Hegel finds this moral teleology 
insufficient if limited to the willings of autonomous individuals, but 
transforms rather than rejects it, developing an account of shared history 
permeated by the purposes of Absolute Spirit. At the other end of the 
spectrum from the maximalist position we find Nietzsche and the moral 
skeptics; their position is characterized by the rejection of any form of 
inherent teleology. Between these two extremes are two further posi-
tions: the 'mediating position,' which limits itself to moral psychology as 
a ground for morality but still relates the psychological foundations of 
morals to the moral purposes of God, and the 'minimalist position,' 
which is essentially a form of consequentialism in which any link to pur-
poses beyond those of involving our aversions and desires is severed. 
Although Holmes concentrates on telling his story rather than argu-
ing at any length for or against the philosophical options it reveals, his 
sympathies clearly lie with the maximalist position: lilts long influence 
in several strands of philosophy, its on-going fruitfulness, and its agility 
in the face of objections, all argue for its continued viability." (p. 174) 
But while favoring maximalism, Holmes recognizes that the other posi-
tions also have something to teach us. He credits Nietzsche, for exam-
ple, with having issued a salutary reminder that there is no such thing as 
a view from nowhere; our attempts to gain knowledge are always 
shaped and limited by the concrete historical, social, and personal situa-
tions in which we find ourselves. Commitment to a perspectivalism of 
this sort, however, does not require rejecting objective truths about val-
ues. As human beings we can only access such truths by approaching 
them from human perspectives; but this is perfectly compatible with 
these truths having a reality of their own independently of the human 
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activity of knowing. Holmes thus acknowledges our embeddedness 
within a web of relations, but goes on to insist that if a relationship with 
God is key among them we must reopen the issue of an intrinsic teleolo-
gy in nature. He favors (without here much developing) the 
Whiteheadean notion that ethics be grounded in a teleology of real pos-
sibilities functioning as universals. God remains free, as often are we, to 
choose which of these universal possibilities are actualized. 
The die-hard moral skeptic is unlikely to be much moved by the 
sketchy hints for recovering a moral ontology offered at the end of Fact, 
Value, and God. A story is not, after all, an argument, and even those 
who agree that a story has been well and accurately told may draw radi-
cally different morals at the end. Even so, the way a story is told, as 
much as the events related, can often contribute significantly to what we 
make out of it. Holmes great skill as a philosophical story teller lies not 
in giving well-composed but static snapshots of the logical interconnec-
tions between one and another aspect of a system of thought, but in trac-
ing out the manifold ways in which ideas develop and transform over 
time. The coherence with which his story unfolds is of a piece with his 
own deep conviction that "history .. .is not without continuity." (p. 179) 
Although the entire second half of Holmes' tale has to do with the mod-
em unraveling of the maximalist position, the fact that the tale can be 
told with as much continuity as Holmes gives it suggests that we are 
not, after all, simply left with loose ends. Having seen so clearly how we 
got where are, we can hope to pick up the threads once more, reweaving 
the warp of fact with the woof of value, to fashion anew a pattern suit-
able to our current historical situation. 
Arthur Holmes' accomplishment in Fact, Value, and God is to provide 
orientation as opposed to argument or detailed history. He presupposes 
some philosophical background but his book can be read with profit by 
relative newcomers to the field as well as by professionals; it will com-
mend itself to anyone who likes a good yam, spun by a storyteller who 
sees pattern and purpose even in what ostensibly might look like the 
loss of such. More optimistic than Alasdair MacIntyre and less idiosyn-
cratic in the figures he focuses on than Charles Taylor, Holmes offers a 
timely reminder that while we postmoderns may be inclined to reduce 
intellectual moves to political power plays, the intellectuals whose 
movements make up the canon of western thought had a very real and 
considered commitment to truths that transcend our powers. Step back 
and take the broad view, Holmes urges, and you will see that our cur-
rent moral confusion is also a product of our times and by no means our 
inevitable stopping point. We may temporarily seem to have lost our 
way, but with good will, effort, and grace, there is every hope that we 
will find it again. The story goes on ... 
